How Much of a Threat is Islamic State Khorasan Province?
Posted: 23 Apr 2018 12:18 AM PDT
http://elizabethkendal.blogspot.com/2018/04/how-much-of-threat-is-islamic-state.html
By Elizabeth Kendal
Christians Targeted in Quetta
In Pakistan’s south-western city of Quetta, the capital of sparsely
populated Balochistan Province, the already vulnerable Christian community
is under attack.
On Sunday morning, 17 December, at least nine people were killed and more
than 50 injured when two suicide bombers blew themselves up at Bethel
Memorial Methodist Church, as some 200 local Christians were participating
in a special “Sunday School Christmas Program”. . [See RLPB 437 (19 Dec
2017)].
On the evening of Easter Monday 2 April, four members of a Christian family
were travelling along Quetta’s Shah Zaman road when militants on a
motorbike intercepted their rickshaw and open fired. A young girl was
wounded and rushed to hospital. Her father and three cousins were killed.
Then on Sunday 15 April, four men on two motorbikes opened fire on
Christians in Quetta’s Isa Nagri (City of Jesus; a Christian
neighbourhood). Some of the victims were emerging from a worship service;
others were just sitting in front of their homes. Two Christians were
killed and three were critically wounded.
The widow of slain Azhar Iqbal (26).
Christian funeral in Quetta, 18 April [Photo Gallery]
On each occasion, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK-P) claimed
responsibility.
For more details see: Religious Liberty Prayer Bulletin (RLPB) 451
Pakistan: Islamic State targets Christians in Quetta, 18 April 2018
by Elizabeth Kendal
Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK-P)
Khorasan denotes a historical region covering all of Afghanistan along with
parts of Iran, Central Asia, western China and Pakistan. ISK-P is Islamic
State’s franchise in Khorasan Province / Wilayat-e-Khorasan.
After the death in 2013 of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, the Taliban found
itself wracked with internal conflicts and divisions. Meanwhile, internal
conflicts and divisions were also emerging in the jihadist movement in
Meopotamia (Syria-Iraq) between al-Qaeda head Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi who had established an al-Qaeda franchise in Syria under
the leadership of Abu Muhammad al-Julani. The split in May 2013 left two
jihadist factions fighting for dominance in northern Syria: Jabhat
al-Nusra, which remained loyal to al-Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri and al-Julani, and
the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (Greater Syria / the Levant; ISIS/ISIL),
whose members swore allegiance to al-Baghdadi.
In January 2014, ISIS expelled al-Nusra from the provincial capital of
Raqqa (in northern Syria) and assumed full control of the city. In April
2014, al-Baghdadi escalated the ideological dispute by insisting that there
would be no reconciliation with al-Zawahiri’s al-Qaeda. As far the
vehemently anti-Shi’ite al-Baghdadi was concerned, al-Zawahiri’s
willingness to cooperate with Shi’ite Iran was proof that al-Qaeda was on a
divergent path. When al-Baghdadi threw down the gauntlet and demanded all
Muslims recognise his authority, nine prominent al-Qaeda leaders from the
region historically known as Greater Khorasan immediately declared their
allegiance to al-Baghdadi.
In January 2015, a group of disgruntled Pakistani Taliban and Afghan
Taliban commanders produced a propaganda video in which they formerly
pledged allegiance to Islamic State. Within days of the video’s release,
the Islamic State announced its expansion into Khorasan Province and
officially appointed Hafiz Saeed Khan as the Wali (Governor) of Khorasan
and former Guantanamo Bay detainee and senior Taliban leader Mullah Abdul
Rauf Khadim as Khan’s deputy. The group would be based in Afghanistan.
For more information see:
Mapping the emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan
By LWJ Staff, 5 March, 2015
After Saturday Comes Sunday: Understanding the Christian Crisis in the
Middle East, by Elizabeth Kendal (Wipf and Stock, Eugene OR, June 2016).
Chapter 8 ‘The Evolution of a War,’ from subheading ‘Raqqa and the
Al-Nusra-ISIS split’ through ‘The Khorasan Pledge’ (pp 154 through 164).
In Khorasan as in Mesopotamia, Islamic State has shown itself to be the
enemy not only of Shi’ites, but of all minorities, Christians included.
In Khorasan as in Mesopotamia, the pro-Islamic State and pro-al-Qaeda Sunni
Islamic jihadist factions clash over ideology, tactics, strategy and
territory.
In Khorasan as in Mesopotamia, most locals denounce Islamic State’s zealous
brutality and total disregard for history and local culture.
In Khorasan as in Mesopotamia, Islamic State exploits a prophetic hadith
(alleged saying of Muhammad).
The Khorasan Hadith
In Mesopotamia (Syria-Iraq) Islamic State rallied around a prophetic hadith
concerning Dabiq (a town in north-western Syria) in which Muhammad is
alleged to have said:
First issue of Islamic State’s
magazine, DABIQ, July 2014.“The Last Hour would not come until the Romans
would land at al-A’maq or in Dabiq.” https://sunnah.com/muslim/54/44
The leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Abu Musab al-Zaraqawi (killed in June
2006) sighted this hadith when he predicted that the war in Iraqi was but
the first stage of an apocalyptic battle that would culminate with Muslim
victory in Dabiq: “The spark has been lit here in Iraq and its heat will
continue to intensify…until it burns the Crusader armies in Dabiq.”
Islamic State embraced the prophetic hadith and al-Zaraqawi’s prediction
effectively exploiting it to recruit Muslim men and women from all over the
world and every walk of life.
A similar dynamic potentially exists in “Khorasan” on account of another
prophetic hadith:
“Black standards [flags] will come from Khorasan, nothing shall turn them
back until they are planted in Jerusalem.” (Source: Sunan At-Tirmidhi 2269)
The fact that this hadith is widely regarded as weak and probably
inauthentic is irrelevant to the jihadists who have exploited it for
decades.
early propaganda video
“The Emergence of Prophecy:
The Black Flags of Khorasan” As writer Asif Ullah Khan explains, “The first
time this hadith was used in the sub-continent was in 1980 when the US and
Saudi Arabia cobbled up the biggest global jihad coalition to wage a
guerrilla war against the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan.
“Brigadier Asad Munir, who commanded Pakistan’s intelligence service, the
ISI, in the tribal areas until 2005, says the Khorasan hadith was one of
the main reasons why Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
have become a rendezvous of sorts for Jihadists from all over the world.”
So, How Much of Threat is ISK-P?
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
addresses the UN Security CouncilOn Friday 19 January, Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov warned the UN Security Council that jihadists
fleeing Syria were turning northern Afghanistan into “a main base for
international terrorism with the Afghan wing of the Islamic State in the
lead”. Lavrov added that 2017 saw an “unprecedented growth in Afghan drug
production”, the funds from which are known to fuel international
terrorism. He recommended “prompt measures . . . to curb this threat”.
On 20 February, Lavrov expressed his frustration that the US and NATO
simply refuse to confront the reality of ISK-P:
“We are alarmed as unfortunately, the US and NATO military in Afghanistan
makes every effort to silence and deny [the IS group’s presence in
Afghanistan],” Lavrov told reporters after talks with his Pakistani
counterpart Khawaja Muhammad Asif.
“According to our data, the IS presence in northern and eastern Afghanistan
is rather serious, there are already thousands of gunmen. This increases
the risk of the terrorists’ penetration to Central Asia and it is not that
difficult to get to Russia.”
Contrary to this, the position of the US – which is eager to depart from
Afghanistan with a semblance of dignity – is that ISK-P is insignificant
and does not present a serious threat. According to the US, Russia is
merely “peddling a narrative” and “exaggerating” for political gain.
Consequently, Russian efforts to forge security cooperation across Central
Asia are being mocked and derided in the West.
According to the US, Russia exaggerates and exploits fears of Islamic State
simply so it might further project itself across Central Asia. Further to
this, Navy Capt. Tom Gresback, public affairs director at Resolute Support
headquarters, told Military Times, “[U.S. Forces-Afghanistan] has no
evidence of any significant migration of IS-K foreign fighters. We see
local fighters who switch allegiances to join ISIS for various reasons, but
the Russian narrative grossly exaggerates the numbers of ISIS fighters that
are in the country.”
Gen. John Nicholson, the head of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, agrees. “This
[Russian] narrative then is used as a justification for the Russians to
legitimize the actions of the Taliban and provide some degree of support to
the Taliban.”
Apart from the fact that Taliban is only a threat to Russia (or the US) if
it is providing sanctuary to trans-nationalist jihadi movements such as
al-Qaeda, as it did before 9/11, Russia has no interest in supporting
Islamic militancy in its own backyard. Not only does Russia deny that it is
supporting the Taliban, so too does the Taliban which insists it has “not
received assistance from any country”.
For more on this dispute see:
Is Russia arming the Afghan Taliban?
By Dawood Azami, BBC World Service, 2 April 2018
Is ISIS gaining ‘serious’ ground in Afghanistan? Russia says yes. The US
says no.
By Kyle Rempfer, for Military Times, 26 March 2018
Why Russia Exaggerates Islamic State’s Presence in Afghanistan
By Samuel Ramani, for The Diplomat, 10 April 2018
Islamic State seizes new Afghan foothold after luring Taliban defectors
Matin Sahak and Girish Gupta, for Reuters, 2 December 2017.
So, How Much of Threat is ISK-P?
ISK-P suffered numerous losses through 2016 – some at the hands of the
Taliban, some at the hands of US-backed Afghan forces. This culminated in
April 2017 when the US military detonated a Massive Ordnance Air Blast
(MOAB) munition over an ISK-P tunnel complex in Nangarhar, eastern
Afghanistan.
Despite this, ISK-P has not only endured but grown in strength and
capability. ISK-P has gone on to commit horrific killings and even
spectacular terror attacks, including against high-profile targets in the
centre of Kabul such as the 25 December bombing of the National Directorate
for Security, and the bombing on 22 April of a voter registration centre in
which at least 57 people were killed and around 120 wounded.
A report published in January in the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism
Monitor gives credence to the Russian assessment that ISK-P is growing,
consolidating and expanding and that this is indeed, “rather serious”.
Recommended:
Islamic State Gains Ground in Afghanistan as Its Caliphate Crumbles
Elsewhere
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 16 Issue: 2
By Animesh Roul, 26 January 2018
Roul’s opening assessment is blunt: “Wilayat-e-Khorasan, the Islamic State
(IS) affiliate in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan, is one of
the terrorist group’s strongest franchises. Bolstered by defections from
the Taliban and boosted further in recent months by an influx of foreign
fighters fleeing defeat in Iraq and Syria, IS Khorasan Province (ISK-P) is
growing in strength and influence.”
In Roul’s assessment, ISK-P has “expanded its influence beyond its
operational headquarters in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province, which borders
Pakistan’s tribal regions”. Roul explains that ISK-P has been able to carry
out “mass-fatality attacks in cities from Jalalabad and Kabul in
Afghanistan, to Quetta and Lahore in Pakistan.
“Alarmingly,” he adds, “in September last year, an IS flag bearing the
message ‘The khilafat (caliphate) is coming’ was even seen hoisted on a
pedestrian bridge near Iqbal town in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital.”
As Roul explains, “The rise and consolidation of ISK-P in Afghanistan and
Pakistan has been aided by intra-Taliban rivalry triggered by the death of
Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Recruitment has been aided elsewhere by the
Deobandi seminaries, which have for decades propagated sectarian ideals in
the tribal regions. Further, ISK-P – like its parent organization in Syria
and Iraq – has gone beyond these more traditional support structures, using
social media to attract more educated and tech-savvy city dwellers.”
According to Roul, “in early 2017, Pakistani agencies uncovered IS
recruitment networks in Punjab and Lahore”.
As Roul explains, ISK-P’s ranks are increasingly being swelled by foreign
fighters – French, Algerian, Uzbeks, Indians, Russians [mostly ‘Chechens’],
Pakistanis and Tajiks etc — including females, most of whom are fleeing
the fighting in Syria. [This confirms the Reuters report of 2 December 2017
(linked above).]
Roul concludes, it is “certain that a safe haven for ISK-P militants has
developed in the tribal lands of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The present
situation suggests fleeing militants could find a new lease on life and win
further sympathizers to the crumbling caliphate, allowing ISK-P to grow in
stature in the region.”
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I make the case in After Saturday Comes Sunday: Understanding the Christian
Crisis in the Middle East, that the dar al-Islam (house of Islam) has long
exploited divisions in the dar al-harb (house of war). Indeed, it is a fact
that Islam has mastered the art of inserting itself as a wedge between East
and West, exploiting East-West completion and playing East and West off
against each other for its own strategic purposes and geo-political gain.
See: After Saturday Comes Sunday: Understanding the Christian Crisis in the
Middle East, by Elizabeth Kendal (Wipf and Stock, Eugene OR, June 2016).
Chapter 11, ‘A House Divided’.
Until East and West can cooperate against their common enemy – revived
fundamentalist Islam – then the future remains dark, like a vision of
endless war.
If East and West can not cooperate against revived fundamentalist Islam
then the chaos in Mesopotamia and Khorasan – which includes nuclear-armed
Pakistan – will continue to deepen and spread.
In Khorasan as in Mesopotamia, this bodes ill for religious minorities, in
particular for the region’s exceedingly vulnerable Christians who look to
the West for help only to be betrayed and abandoned.
In what may prove to be prophetic utterance, a Syrian Church leader
predicted in April 2014 that the time is coming when Christians “will no
longer look to the West for support . . . but to the East, to Russia, to
India, to China” (After Saturday Comes Sunday, p165).
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Elizabeth Kendal is an international religious liberty analyst and
advocate. She serves as Director of Advocacy at Canberra-based Christian
Faith and Freedom (CFF), and is an Adjunct Research Fellow at the Arthur
Jeffery Centre for the Study of Islam at Melbourne School of Theology.
She has authored two books: Turn Back the Battle: Isaiah Speaks to
Christians Today (Deror Books, Melbourne, Australia, Dec 2012) which offers
a Biblical response to persecution and existential threat; and After
Saturday Comes Sunday: Understanding the Christian Crisis in the Middle
East (Wipf and Stock, Eugene, OR, USA, June 2016).
See www.ElizabethKendal.com